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Abstract
Aim of this work is to evaluate the overall effect of social origins on secondary school track 
enrolment   in   Italy,   Germany   and   Netherlands,   allowing   for   consistent   cross   country 
comparisons. PISA 2003 is employed. Track choices are assumed to depend on student's 
ability and social origins; since proficiency before tracking is not observed, ability is not kept 
under control. Nonetheless, the unconditional social background effect is the quantity of main 
substantive interest because it represents the total effect of social origins on school choices. 
Yet,   since  regression   coefficients  in   logit   models   are   biased   even   with   independent 
unobserved heterogeneity, comparison across countries are difficult; the  average sample 
derivative of the response probability is employed instead and it is showed to be a valid 
alternative measure of the total social origins effect. The following issue is also addressed: 
social origins inequality in secondary school choices may be affected by access restrictions 
policies, at work in some countries, where enrolment into the more prestigious tracks is 
subject to binding school recommendations or ability tests. First,  we propose a  simple 
theoretical model and we derive that the policy is expected to lower the effect of social 
origins conditional on ability, although the impact on the total effect can either decrease or 
increase. Second, by exploiting the institutional differences across German Länder with 
respect to enrolment policies, we carry out a preliminary empirical analysis within Germany. 
The main empirical findings are: (i) the total effect of social origins on track choice is weaker 
in the Netherlands and  stronger  in Germany, with Italy in between; (ii) within Germany, 
access restriction seem to weaken the parental background effect. 
Keywords:  inequality   of   opportunity,   school   tracks,   access   restrictions,   unobserved 
heterogeneity, logistic regression, 
11. Introduction  
The association between social origin and educational attainment has been the object of a 
large body of comparative research; despite the educational expansion process that has taken 
place in the last decades, inequality has not narrowed much (Breen and Jonsson, 2005; 
Buchmann, 2003; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). Inequality is also evaluated with respect to the 
level of competencies reached at a given level of schooling. The development of international 
surveys such as the PISA-Programme for International Student Assessment carried out by 
OECD to evaluate how students near the end of compulsory education have acquired “some 
of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society” (OECD, 2005) 
highlights that in most countries competencies are greatly dependent on family background. 
Equity and efficiency are not conflicting aims, however, as some of the countries with the 
lower social origin performance differentials are placed at the highest ranks with respect to 
average scores. Given these findings, equality of opportunity in education has become as an 
explicit target in the international educational policy agenda.
Educational systems vary with respect to how schooling careers are differentiated after a 
first stage common to all pupils; in many countries this translates into an set of alternative 
types of secondary schools, identifying distinct school tracks. In tracked systems the level 
and kind of competencies change markedly among school types; moreover in many countries 
access to tertiary education is restricted to a track specifically conceived to prepare for 
university studies, often called the academic track (or lyceum). The choice of the track is thus 
an important step in the student's life, as it is likely to shape his future educational career and 
consequently, employment prospects. The extent to which this choice is affected by parental 
background has been the object of research in different countries (for Germany: Dustmann, 
2001 and Schnepf, 2002; for Italy: Cappellari, 2004 and Checchi and Flabbi, 2006). Not 
surprisingly, the evidence is that  social background plays a major role in shaping track 
2choices. Checchi and Flabbi (2007) compare Italy and Germany in this respect; we will come 
back shortly to their findings. 
Class differentials in educational attainment are related in the literature to two distinct 
mechanisms: primary and secondary effects (Boudon, 1974, Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002). 
Primary effects refer to the influence of social origin on ability early in children’s educational 
careers. Secondary effects operate through the choices that families make within the 
educational system, given ability. Assuming that families wish to avoid downward mobility, 
the rational action approach (Goldthorpe, 1996; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) provides a 
theoretical explanation for the evidence that, conditional on performance, school choices vary 
across social background. The evaluation of the relative importance of primary and secondary 
effects is the aim of a growing body of literature (for example, Erikson et al 2005, Jackson et 
al  2007), in particular at the moment of secondary school choice,  providing empirical 
evidence of the relevance of secondary effects in the creation of class differentials in 
educational attainment. However, since the analysis are carried out on national level data, 
comparing the results across countries is not an easy task.
A recent body of research carried out mainly by economists (Hanushek and Woessman, 
2005; Woessman, 2007; Brunello and Checchi, 2007) tackles the issue of the impact 
evaluation of specific institutional features on inequality of opportunity, by exploiting the 
cross-national variability available in international surveys such as PISA, TIMMS and IALS
1. 
The main object of investigation is the effect of the age of tracking on school performance or 
later educational attainment; overall, there is strong evidence that inequality is enhanced with 
early tracking.  Similarly, Pfeffer (2008) examining the overall degree of inequality in 
educational attainment in the last decades in many countries, relates inequality to institutional 
features of the schooling systems, drawing the conclusion that more stratified systems exhibit 
on average a lower intergenerational educational mobility.
Aim of the present work is to compare the total effect of social origins on secondary 
3school track enrolment in Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. The empirical analysis is based 
on data from PISA 2003. Although PISA has not been designed for this purpose, its major 
advantage with respect to national data archives is that variables (in particular variables 
measuring social background) and the sampling scheme are common, favouring cross-
country comparability. Moreover, PISA represents a valid alternative to other data sources if 
no longitudinal data specifically designed to record youth schooling and working careers is 
available. This is the case for Italy, where the only survey specifically designed for 
investigating schooling careers is a cross-sectional survey on secondary school leavers
2, a 
sample obviously affected by a strong non-random selection; since sampling occurs at age 15, 
selection bias due to school drop-out is weaker with PISA
3.
The countries under study differ with respect to many institutional features. First, tracking 
occurs at different ages: at 14 in Italy, at 12 in the Netherlands, at 10 in Germany. Second, 
while in Italy there is practically full freedom of choice, in some German Länder and in 
Netherlands enrolment to the more prestigious tracks, lyceum in particular, is limited by 
binding school's recommendations or proficiency tests. As explained later, the role of access 
restrictions on inequality of opportunity in secondary school choices will be object of specific 
attention in the present work. Countries school designs differ in many aspects and it is 
difficult to find a comparable classification among academic, technical and vocational 
schools; moreover the German education system is Länder-based, so students face a different 
set of available options from state to state. Hence, we focus on the more clear-cut distinction 
between the academic track (lyceum) and all other tracks; this is common in the literature 
(Erikson et al, 2005) and retains a close relation to tertiary education decisions.
The analysis is carried out by referring to a simple model for the ability development 
process, where social background is assumed to influence ability at each stage of the 
individuals' schooling life: the rationale is that high status parents are more likely to sustain 
and motivate school work and provide a stimulating environment throughout their offspring 
4growth. Coherently with the literature, our model relates secondary school track choices to 
the student's ability and to social origins. Since a measure of performance before tracking is 
not provided, ability is not kept under control and primary and secondary effects are not 
disentangled. Nonetheless, wishing to provide a synthetic measure of inequality across 
countries, the unconditional social background effect is the quantity of main substantive 
interest because it represents the total effect of social origins on secondary school choices.
The interest in comparing Italy and Germany stems from the following reasons. First, 
Germany is an interesting reference point as its early tracking system has been sharply 
criticized because it is believed to enhance parents’ social background influence on future 
educational attainment (Dustmann, 2001; Schnepf, 2002; Sinn, 2006). Second, Checchi and 
Flabbi (2007) – who also compare Italy and Germany with respect to the effect of social 
background on secondary school choices with PISA – claim instead that students' sorting into 
tracks is less related to parental background and more to individual ability in Germany than 
Italy. They also claim that the supposedly weaker social origin effect could be due to the fact 
that some German Länder enforce stricter performance-based transition processes from 
primary to secondary school, while in Italy there is freedom of choice
4. As we will argue 
more thoroughly in Section 4, we question this result for two reasons: (i) The measure they 
employ for the comparison is the effect of social background conditional on ability. We think 
instead that the relevant measure for assessing the effect of social origins should be the 
unconditional effect, as the former represents secondary effects only, while the latter the total 
effect; (ii) With the aim to assess the conditional effect, PISA scores are used to proxy 
ability
5: the flaw is that these scores refer to a time well after that of choice and thus are 
endogenous. A simulation exercise has been developed (and presented in the Appendix) to 
show that this practice can lead to severely biased estimates. In this light, we think that the 
comparison between Italy and Germany should be re-evaluated. 
On the other hand, Checchi and Flabbi's idea that access restrictions could reduce the 
5impact of social background on school choices is stimulating and we think it should be given 
specific attention. To our knowledge, there are no studies addressing this issue. Our work is 
an attempt to fill this gap. First, we develop a simple theoretical model to shed light on how 
access restrictions should influence the effect of social status on secondary school enrolment; 
we show that restrictions should lower the effect of social origins conditional on ability, but 
the impact on the total effect can go in either directions. Second, by exploiting the 
institutional differences across the German Länder with respect to enrolment policies, we 
carry out a preliminary empirical analysis within Germany. Under the (strong) assumption 
that the model is well specified, the policy impact on inequality of opportunity can be 
assessed simply by comparing the social background effect between states with and without 
restrictions. 
The main empirical findings are that the total effect of social origins on track choice is 
weaker in the Netherlands and stronger in Germany, with Italy in between; and that within 
Germany, parental background appears to be less important where access is regulated by 
ability assessments. As our theoretical model suggests, however, the latter should not be 
considered a general result. Note that ethical arguments against restrictions, related to the 
concern that some individuals are not given the chance to enter the academic track – even if 
there is the awareness that ability assessment may be flawed by measurement error, and that 
children develop skills at different stages of their lives and may catch up after sorting has 
taken place – are not addressed here.
A statistical problem frequently overlooked in the empirical literature is also addressed. 
Logistic model regression coefficients – functionally related to odd-ratios, and  commonly 
employed in the literature to measure the association between a binary variable and another 
variable – are estimable up to arbitrary identification restrictions on the error variance, and 
with independent unobserved heterogeneity are biased towards zero. Although ability is not 
independent of social background, we can still refer to the independent heterogeneity 
6framework if the total effect is the parameter of interest. Since the bias depends on the 
variance of the omitted variable, comparing regression coefficients estimates across countries 
can lead to misleading results. On the other hand, by extending Cramer (2005) simulation 
study, we show that the average sample derivative of the response probability with respect to 
social background is substantially unbiased even when ability is unobserved. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the institutional features 
of the educational systems in the countries of interest. Some evidence on stratification in 
secondary schools is presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the model for secondary 
school choices and the ability development process. The statistical problems arising when 
comparing explanatory variables effects across samples with unobserved heterogeneity are 
discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 we develop a simple theoretical model for the effect of 
access restrictions on equality of opportunity. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 
7. Conclusions follow in Section 8. The simulation study is described in the Appendix.
2. Educational Systems
2.1 Italy
Compulsory education goes from age 6 to 15. There are five years of primary school and 
three years of comprehensive lower secondary education. At 14 students choose their upper 
secondary school between many different programmes. The academic track lasts five years 
and includes different types of lyceum: classical, scientific, linguistic, artistic. The socio-
pedagogic lyceum  prepares for the primary teacher career. Although further university 
education is now required, until a few years ago the school gave direct access to the 
profession; for this reason it is not fully perceived as an academic programme
6. The technical 
and vocational tracks (lasting respectively five and three years) lead directly to a professional 
qualification. There are no special admission requirements, such as ability tests or marks, to 
7enter the different tracks. After five years of schooling (with two integrative years for 
vocational schools), all tracks give access to university (Eurydice, 2006b). In practice, only 
few students from the vocational track enter tertiary education.
2.2 Netherlands
Primary education lasts 8 years, from age 4-5 to 12-13 (most students start at 4). Schooling 
is compulsory until age 16, with one more year of part-time or full-time education (Eurydice, 
2006c). At twelve pupils are divided into three main tracks. The academic VWO prepares for 
university in six years, HAVO provides higher general education for five years giving access 
to higher professional education and VMBO is a vocational school, divided into different 
pathways lasting four years and giving access to apprenticeship. Students' suitability for the 
different tracks is assessed by a primary school leavers attainment test (CITO)
7; parents may 
express preferences, but the secondary school board has the final decision. Lower secondary 
education (the first three years of VWO and HAVO or the whole VMBO course) must be 
completed in five-six years. If students fail twice in the same grade they  must change track. 
VMBO or HAVO leaving certificates give access to the higher level tracks only with a good 
curriculum. A noticeable feature of the Dutch system is the diffusion of publicly financed 
private schools, attended by over 70% of all students (Eurydice, 2003).
2.3 Germany
The German school system is rather heterogeneous, since the Länder are responsible for 
education. Tracking occurs at age 10 in most states, with the exception of the states of Berlin 
and Brandenburg, where it takes place at age 12 (Woessmann 2007). Institutional differences 
regard also school track types and admission requirements. Compulsory education is from 
age 6 to 18, with at least 9 full-time schooling years. Primary school lasts four years (age 6-
10); the school board generally gives recommendation  for the transition to secondary school, 
8but while in some Länder families are still free to choose
8, in others enrolment is conditional 
on binding school recommendations
9. During secondary school each grade can be repeated 
only once: a second failure in the same or the following grade compels a change to a lower 
level track. In most Länder there are three tracks: Gymnasium (academic), lasting nine years 
(recently being reduced to eight) for a total 12 years of schooling, Realschule (professional, 
six years), and Hauptschule (vocational, five or six years). The first gives access to university, 
the others to different professional or vocational education and apprenticeship, usually 
combining job training and school lessons. After  Hauptschule,  the  Realschule  leaving 
certificate can be obtained as well, conditional on the achievement level. Similar rules apply 
for the transition from  Realschule  to  Gymnasium. In some Länder the  Realschule  and 
Hauptschule  programmes are provided in the same school
10,  with distinct school leaving 
certificates   (Eurydice,   2006a).   In   many   states   there   are   also   comprehensive   schools 
(Integrierte Gesamtschule or Kooperative Gesamtschule) sometimes attracting more students 
than the traditional tracks. Thus every Länder has its very own combination of school types 
and admission rules.
3. Stratification in schools. Evidence from PISA 
PISA is an international survey of the skills of 15 year olds promoted every three years by 
OECD. Each survey covers different topics: mathematics, reading comprehension, science 
and problem solving. The main topic for PISA 2003 is mathematics: tests evaluate how well 
students can recognize, formulate and tackle mathematical problems in real life contexts. 
Detailed information on family background is recorded, and a specific index measured on a 
continuous scale – ESCS (index of Economic, Social and Cultural Status, see Section 7) – is 
provided. 
PISA reveals wide differences in countries’ skill profiles (OECD, 2004). Average scores in 
9math tests are reported in Table 1, column (5): Italy is placed at the lowest ranks in the 
OECD
11, Germany is around the average, while the Netherlands is considered a well 
performing country. 
Simple   measures   of   stratification   in   school   can   be   computed   with   PISA  because 
approximately 30 students are chosen within each school. A measure of social stratification is 
given by the ratio of the variance between schools to the total variance of ESCS. Table 1, 
column (1) reports such ratio for selected countries. Generally, early tracked systems rank in 
the top half of the list (Hungary, Austria, Italy, Germany); Netherlands is an exception, 
exhibiting a much smaller value, close to that of late tracking school systems. Similar results 
hold for the percentage of variance between tracks (instead of single schools), reported in 
column (2). A measure of performance stratification, provided by an analysis of variance of 
math PISA scores, is reported in columns 3-4. Netherlands places first in the OECD area, 
followed by Germany. Variance between single schools is over 60% of the total variance and 
over 50% between school tracks for both countries. The value for Italy is somewhat smaller at 
the single school level, dropping to less than 25% for tracks. 
The differences across schools and school tracks should be interpreted cautiously, because 
PISA scores measure ability after choice. Since skills keep on developing during secondary 
school, with different rates across individuals and tracks, the data does not tell us how well 
students are tracked according to their ability. Cross-country comparisons are difficult also 
because tracking occurs at different ages. Nevertheless, these numbers suggest that:
• in the Netherlands students are well divided by ability into tracks and these differences 
reflect social differences only to a small extent;
• in Germany school sorting also seems to be highly related to ability (although the earlier 
tracking makes the issue of endogeneity more severe), but social stratification in schools is 
much stronger than in the Netherlands;
10• social differences among schools are also deep in Italy; since score variability is large 
across schools but not across tracks, differences in ability among students of different 
schools are only partially  related to differences in the curricula.
Table 1. Social stratification in schools. Analysis of variance between schools and between school 
types for ESCS and PISA mathematic scores. Selected countries






















Hungary 0.449 0.315 Netherlands 0.659 0.556 538
Austria 0.343 0.256 Germany 0.629 0.511 503
Italy 0.343 0.216 Hungary 0.602 0.413 490
Germany 0.332 0.232 Belgium 0.575 0.545 529
Belgium 0.331 0.252 Italy 0.569 0.246 466
France 0.315 0.159 Austria 0.563 0.411 506
Spain 0.305 * France 0.520 0.450 511
United States 0.272 * United States 0.310 * 483
Netherlands 0.257 0.159 Spain 0.272 * 485
Finland 0.141 * Finland 0.083 * 544
h
2 is the ratio of the variance between schools or school-types over the total variance of ESCS or PISA scores
* Systems with no tracking before age 15
4. The model 
“Human capital accumulation is a dynamic process. The skills acquired in one stage of the 
life cycle affect both the initial conditions and the technology of learning at the next stage.” 
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2003, pg. 6). In this perspective we propose a simple model for the 
ability development process (see Figure 1), where the factors affecting ability include 
individual endowments (innate ability) and family endowments (social origins). Since the 
different tracks can provide a different “added value”, ability after tracking is also allowed to 
depend on the school type. Although not explicit in the figure, institutional features obviously 
enter the picture, affecting the whole process in potentially complex ways. 
The issue we address here is how strongly social background affects secondary school 
choices, assuming that:
11i. there is a latent unobservable individual “innate ability” which might be correlated or 
not correlated with individual’s social background;
ii. individual ability
12 before school choice  ( “previous ability”) depends on innate ability 
and social origins;
iii. the choice of the secondary school track depends on previous ability and social origins 
(although track and innate ability are independent given previous ability). 
Consequently, social background can affect school-choice in two distinct ways:
• Direct   effect:   given   the   level   of   ability,   individuals   from   the   advantaged   social 
backgrounds are more likely to enter the academic track (because of higher incentives and 
aspirations, lower opportunity costs, higher probability of success);    
• Indirect effect: higher status children reach on average higher levels of ability at the end of 
primary or lower secondary school (as they are generally exposed to more intellectual 
stimulation, receive more parental motivation and support for schoolwork); being more 
skilled, they are expected to prefer the academic track. 
Notice that direct and indirect effects are strictly related to primary and secondary effects. 
The indirect effect depends on the relation between social background and early ability, and 
on the relation between early ability and school track; the latter is affected by the way 
preferences for a particular track are affected by ability, but also on admission policies. If 
enrolment is conditional on achievement (as occurs in Netherlands and some German Länder) 
only the higher performing students are admitted to the academic track. Such mechanism has 
not been taken into explicit consideration in the literature on primary and secondary effects, 
but it has a relevance in shaping class differentials and should be acknowledged if research 
focuses on policy evaluation: we will discuss this point in Section 6. 
Data on student's ability before secondary school choice is needed to disentangle direct and 
indirect effects. As Breen et al. (2005) point out, the different effects of social origin on 
12educational attainment cannot be disentangled without longitudinal data. In this context, 
surveys like PISA with a longitudinal design would allow to relate the whole ability 
development process sketched in Figure 1 to social origins. 
Nonetheless, under the assumptions sketched above, when modelling school choice 
without controlling for ability the regression coefficient of  SB  is a relevant measure for 
comparing the strength of inequality of opportunity among social strata in different countries, 
as it represents the total effect of social origins on school track, given by the direct plus the 
indirect effect. 
 
Figure 1. Modeling secondary school choices and the ability development process
Let  ABt  represent ability at time  t. Consider the time of birth  t=0, a time  t=1 before 
secondary school choice and the time t=2 after track choice. Thus: AB0 is the unobservable 
innate ability; AB1   is previous ability (potentially observable, but here unobserved); AB2   is 
ability some time after tracking (measured for example by the PISA score). 
SB is a measure of social background and TC a binary indicator of academic track choice. 
Formalizing the model in Figure 1, we assume that individual ability develops as follows:

































AB2i='' AB1i' SBi'TCiu'i (3)
U is a latent variable related to the utility of enrolling in the alternative tracks
13, and TC its 
observed counterpart. The errors for each equation are mutually independent and independent 
from the explanatory variables included in their own equation. All regression coefficients in 
the model are likely to be positive. If the error i has a standard logistic distribution, equations 




=AB1iSBi    (4)
Equation (3) is based on the assumption that ability after tracking is directly affected by 
previous ability, school-type and social background. This equation – not directly relevant for 
assessing inequality in school choices – is employed to evaluate with simulations the strategy 
adopted by Checchi and Flabbi (2006, 2007) of using the PISA score as a proxy for ability 
before tracking. The problem is that PISA scores refer to a time well after that of school 
choice (1 year after for Italy, 3 for Netherlands, 5 for Germany), thus they are (highly) 
endogenous. The simulation exercise, described in the Appendix, shows that both the direct 
effect of social background on school track     and the ability coefficient l can be severely 
biased.
If ability is not included as an explanatory variable, the equation for latent U becomes: 
U i=AB0iSBiuiSBiεi  
         =SBiAB0iuiεi  (5)
The coefficient of SB is now   , the total effect of social background on the probability 
to enrol in higher track schools; it includes the direct effect  plus the indirect effect . As 
14we have argued before, this unconditional effect is the quantity of main interest. The direct 
effects of ability and social background  and are instead not separately identified. 
Notice that if innate ability and social background are independent, class differentials may 
be caused by different “nurture” effects and by the different rational behaviour among social 
classes. If instead innate ability and social background are correlated, the total effect also 
includes “nature” effects
14. Letting AB0=a+SB+w, the total effect in this case is equal to 
 .
The consequences of neglecting ability in binary response models for school track choice 
are discussed in the next Section. 
5.  Assessing the total effect of social background
Assessing the effect of explanatory variables on the response variable is less straightforward 
in   binary   response   models   than  it   is  in   linear   models,   in   particular   with   neglected 
heterogeneity. This circumstance is relevant in our context because – wishing to evaluate the 
unconditional effect of social background with respect to the distribution of ability – we omit 
the explanatory variable “previous ability” from the estimated model. 
5.1 General discussion
Let Y be a binary response variable, X the K-vector of explanatory variables and  the K-
vector of coefficients. Perhaps the most common way to interpret the effect of explanatory 
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where  Xk  is the explanatory variable of interest and    X_k.  is the vector of the remaining 
15explanatory variables. The advantage is that this ratio in invariant with respect to c. On the 
other hand, the odds-ratio has the disadvantage of not capturing the difference between 
changes in the response probability where the curve is almost flat and where it is steeper, 
neither it recognizes that the slope of the curve varies, given x, with the value of the constant 
and of the other explanatory variables (w in Figure 2).
For this reason, alternative measures based on the absolute change of the response 
probability are now widely employed.  Measures based on the slope of the probability curve, 
i.e., the partial derivative of Pr(Y=1|X) with respect to the explanatory variable Xk. have been 
proposed in the econometric literature for continuos variables
15 (e.g. Long, 1997; Wooldridge, 
2002).  One of them is the slope of the response probability at the average value of the 
explanatory variables vector, which can be thought as a “representative” individual; we call  it 
the effect at the sample average (ESA):
ESA =
∂  PrY=1∣ x
∂xk









n ∂  PrY i=1∣x
∂ xk
For a given k, the ASE changes according to the actual location of the explanatory variables 
in the sample. Suppose we wish to compare the effect of  Xk  across countries. Consider 
countries A and B, with the same value of k; if explanatory variables in country A are located 
where the curve is almost flat while in country B they are in the steep part of the curve then, 
when  Xk  changes, the response probability changes more in B than in A. Coherently, 
B A ASE ASE  .





 Pryi=1∣x1−  Pr yi=1∣x  k                                          (6)
Figure 2. Slope of the logistic function at different values of explanatory variables
The interpretation problems of regression coefficient become more severe with neglected 
heterogeneity. While the omission of an orthogonal regressor (i.e., uncorrelated with the 
included explanatory variables) does not affect OLS estimates in linear models, it will bias  
coefficients towards zero when standard estimation methods for binary choice models are 
employed (Cramer, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). This occurs because arbitrary assumptions on 
the error variance are necessary to identify regression coefficients. When an orthogonal 









where w is the regression coefficient of the neglected variable. If Var(w) or w vary across 
countries, comparing the    's can be meaningless, because the estimates in some contexts are 
more strongly biased than in others. Suppose we find   kA kB . Does this occur because the 
effect of the independent variable is stronger in environment B or because the coefficient is 
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x0more heavily underestimated in A? 
The ASE has the advantage that it is not affected by independent neglected heterogeneity. 
Wooldridge (2002, pg. 471) proves the result for the probit model when the omitted variable 
has a normal distribution. The behaviour of ASE is more difficult to derive analytically for the 
logit model; Cramer (2005) develops a simple simulation study finding that ASE is hardly 
affected also in logit models. A first intuition behind this result is that neglected heterogeneity 
attenuates the differences of the estimated Pr(Y=1|x) across units, which get closer to the 
average probability.   From equation (6), since Pr(Y=1|x)[1- Pr(Y=1|x)] is maximum when 
Pr(Y=1|x)=0.5, this product is overestimated with unobserved heterogeneity; on the other hand, 
   is underestimated, thus the two effects compensate each other. The explanation provided by 
Wooldridge (2002) for probit models is also insightful: partial effects of  Pr(Y=1|X) can be 
employed because they are the average of the partial effects of Pr(Y=1|X,w) over the 
distribution of the omitted variable w. 
5.2 Back to our model
We will now look at how these issues apply to the model in (1)-(4). Since previous ability 
AB1  is correlated with social background  SB, the results derived for the omission of an 
independent variable do not immediately apply to our case. As we have argued in Section 4, 
the omission of previous ability AB1 implies that instead of the original full equation (2c) we 
refer to the reduced form  U i=SBi AB0iuiεi . If  innate ability 
AB0 and SB are independent, the coefficient of SB represents the total effect    and the 
new error term is independent of SB; if AB0 and SB are linearly related, say AB0=a+SB+t , 
U i=aξ SBiiuiεi ;   the   social   origins   coefficient 
becomes      (capturing nature and nurture effects), and the error is still 
independent of  SB. In sum, if we acknowledge that what we are estimating is not the 
18coefficient of SB conditional on ability, but the total effect of SB – which is actually what we 
are interested in –  we can still refer to the independent neglected heterogeneity framework.  
A consequence of the omission of ability is that the error term is now larger than the 
original error in (2a), thus, strictly speaking, when omitting ability the probability no longer 
follows a logistic distribution. Following Cramer, the total effect estimator is biased towards 
zero. In particular, the error depends on   (  the effect of previous ability on track preferences), 
thus the countries where individual ability plays a greater role in shaping school choices 
should suffer from a  larger relative bias. Hence the direct comparison  of  the social 
background coefficient across countries can lead to ambiguous results. 
On the other hand, the corresponding ASE should be nearly unbiased. Since the simulation 
exercise carried out by Cramer (2005) is based on a very simple model, we have implemented 
a simulation study based on model (1)-(4) in order to assess the behaviour of ASE and the 
magnitude of the regression coefficients bias in the present context. The results (shown in the 
Appendix) largely confirm that ASE adequately captures the SB total effect on school choices; 
the effect at the sample mean (ESA)  appears instead to be highly sensitive to neglected 
heterogeneity.
6. Access restrictions
Purpose of this Section is to discuss from a theoretical perspective the effect of access 
restrictions based on ability assessments on inequality: we will show that the direct effect of 
social background on secondary school enrolment is reduced, while the total effect may either 
increase or decrease. A simple theoretical model is proposed. Let us distinguish between TC 
(standing for “track choice”) which represents individual’s preferences and EN representing 
actual enrolment; both are binary variables, taking value 1 for lyceum and 0 for the other 
tracks. Preferences are assumed to be driven by random utility (2a). Lyceum is the preferred 
19track and thus TC=1 if U>0, while TC=0 otherwise.  
When no access restrictions apply, enrolment and preferences overlap, i.e. TC=EN. On the 
other hand, with ability restrictions (assuming a very simple decision rule) students are 
accepted to lyceum only if AB>a0. Enrolment is described by:
   


   

otherwise




    (7)
We assume for simplicity that ability is perfectly assessed, although results do not change 
substantially if we allow for measurement error.  
We now compare the effect of social background on secondary school enrolment with and 
without access restrictions. To simplify the notation, without loss of generality, a binary 
variable SB taking value 1 for “high” status and 0 for “low” status has been employed. 
Two relevant effects of social background on secondary school enrolment are considered; 
(i) the direct effect, measuring the net change of    SB AB EN P , | 1   due to an increase of SB, 
given ability; (ii) the total effect, which  refers instead to the average with respect to the 
distribution of ability:
     SB EN P | 1        
AB
dAB SB AB f SB AB EN P | , | 1                                                  (8)
Notice that the distribution of ability  f(AB) is allowed to depend on social background, 
reflecting the existence of primary effects. 
We now show that, other thing being equal, the policy of restricting lyceum enrolment 
according to ability has the effect of lowering the direct effect of SB, whereas the total effect 
of SB may either increase or decrease. Similar results also hold with independent measure-
ment error. 
20Direct effect
With no restrictions, preferences and actual enrolment coincide, thus:
        SB AB P SB AB U P SB AB TC P SB AB EN P               , | 0 , | 1 , | 1
A measure of the direct effect is:
        AB P AB P SB AB EN P SB AB EN P                      0 , | 1 1 , | 1
On the other hand, with access restrictions, 











, | 1 , | 1
a AB if
a AB if SB AB TC P
SB AB a AB TC P SB AB EN P
thus the direct effect is equal to the no restrictions case for the students passing the ability 
threshold AB>a0, while it is 0 for lower performing students, as all of them, regardless of 
social status, are not admitted to lyceum. Thus, on average, the direct effect of social 
background on school enrolment decreases with access restrictions.
Total  effect
The total effect may be measured by:
    0 | 1 1 | 1      SB EN P SB EN P
With no restrictions it becomes:
       dAB SB AB f AB P dAB SB AB f AB P
AB AB             0 | 1 |        (9)
while, when access depends on ability, it turns into:
       dAB SB AB f AB P dAB SB AB f AB P
a AB a AB              
0 0
0 | 1 |         (10) 
It is not possible to assess  a priori  whether the total effect is higher with or without 
restrictions. This indeterminacy is shown in Figure 3 in the particular case of  e=0  (no 
substantial difference arises with a random component). The bell shaped curves are the ability 
density functions of the low and high social status. The straight lines are the utility functions, 
and depend on both ability and social background. The share of students of each social 
21background level having a preference for lyceum is represented by the area under the ability 
density function corresponding to  U>0. The corresponding share of those eventually 
enrolling into a lyceum is represented by the area where U>0 and AB>a0. 
Panel (a) depicts a case where high status students only are rejected, as all the low status 
having a preference for lyceum are above the ability threshold: in this situation the total effect 
of social background on school choices decreases with access restrictions. Panel (b) refers 
instead to a circumstance where the majority of the low status students who would choose 
lyceum are not admitted because they do not reach the ability threshold, while only a small 
proportion of the high status is rejected, giving rise to a larger total effect with respect to the 
no restrictions environment. 
Figure 3. The effect of access restrictions  on track enrollment 
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Panel b - increasing SB effect
a0
a0= minimum ability to access lyceum
Prestr(EN = 1 | SB = 1) = 0.85 
Prestr(EN = 1 | SB = 0) = 0.08
Punrestr(EN = 1 | SB = 1) = 0.99
Punrestr(EN = 1 | SB = 0) = 0.28  
AB




Panel a - decreasing SB effect
AB a0
f ;U
f( AB | SB = 0)
f( AB | SB = 1)
U(SB = 1)
U(SB = 0)
Prestr(EN = 1 | SB = 1) = 0.75 
Prestr(EN = 1 | SB = 0) = 0.15
Punrestr(EN = 1 | SB = 1) = 0.90
Punrestr(EN = 1 | SB = 0) = 0.15  Summarising, if access restrictions are at work, ability affects both  preferences  and 
admittance, while with free choice only preferences are involved. Although the direct effect 
of social status on enrolment is always reduced with restrictions, the indirect effect driven by 
the differences in ability across different backgrounds can be magnified. As the graph 
suggest, the total effect is likely to increase with restrictions if ability differences among 
social strata are marked while the utility functions are relatively similar.
Looking at the extreme cases can help to clarify the picture.
(i) If f(AB|SB)=f(AB), i.e. the ability distribution is the same for all social classes, the area 
represented by equation (10) is a subset of that in (9), implying a smaller total effect with 
restrictions. In fact:
   
   dAB AB f AB AB P





      
       

     
     
0
(ii) The case where x=0 is not as straightforward, as the total effect may still increase or 
decrease with restrictions. Yet, note that if all social background shared the same utility 
function, the low and the high status would have the same preferences for lyceum given 
ability. Other things being equal, a larger fraction of the low status would be excluded from 
enrolling to lyceum with restrictions when compared to the case where the low status have a 
weaker desire to follow an academic educational programme. Thus, this case is the most 
“favourable” case for an increasing total effect.
    Note that the above discussion holds ceteris paribus. One underlying assumption is that 
preferences do not change: this may not be a sensible hypothesis if, as lyceum becomes more 
selective, the degree acquires value with restrictions. Another assumption which may not hold 
is the invariance of the relation between social background and ability. Anticipatory effects 
are likely to be strengthened: high status parents in particular may be encouraged to provide 
23more support for their children in order to make admission to lyceum more likely, increasing 
the social background differential in the probability of enrollment into the academic track.
7. The empirical analysis
A logistic regression model for track enrollment is estimated for the each country
16. The 
empirical analysis is carried out with data from PISA 2003. The Italian sample size is 11.639, 
including the oversampling requested by local authorities in some regions
17. The available 
German sample comprises 4.660 students, since units due to local oversampling are not 
included, while the Dutch sample is represented by 3.992 units. Students report the type of 
the school they are currently enrolled in, according to the institutional designs at work in the 
countries under study. Since  it is difficult to find a comparable classification among 
academic, technical and vocational schools across countries and German Länder, we focus on 
the distinction between the academic track (lyceum) and all other tracks.  The dependent 
variable is dichotomous,  distinguishing  Liceo  (Italy)
18,  Gymnasium  (Germany) and  VWO 
(Netherlands) from all other school types.
Social background SB is measured by the Index of Economic, Social and Cultural Status as 
defined by PISA. ESCS is a second level continuos index based on three first level indexes, 
regarding parent's professional status, their education and household possessions related to 
culture and technology (e.g. books, PCs). The score is the first principal component in the 
analysis of the three lower level indexes, standardized with respect to OECD average. This 
index   has   the   advantage   with   respect   to   discrete  measures   of   parental   education   or 
occupational status that different aspects of social status are taken into account.  
We allow for gender, immigrant status and family type differences, by including in the 
model the following control variables: GENDER (1=female, 0=male), FOREIGN   (1=non-
native or first-generation student, 0=other),  FAMILY  (“standard family”:  1=father and 
24mother living together with student, 0=other). Moreover, in order to test whether the social 
origins effect varies with demographic characteristics, interactions of these variables with 
ESCS were also included. Geographical differences are marked both in Italy and in Germany. 
A set of dummy variables (North East, Centre, South) are included for Italy (the reference 
category being North West), while the binary variable EAST
19 distinguishes between states of 
the former East and West Germany.  
The evaluation of the impact of access restrictions is based on Germany. Although 
institutional and environmental differences do exist across German Länder, they are likely to 
be weaker than those existing across nations. The explanatory variable RESTRICT (assuming 
value 1 for states where access to Gymnasium and Realschule is based on ability assessments 
and 0 elsewhere) and the interaction between this variabile and the ESCS index were included 
in the German model
20.  Under the assumption that the policy is exogenous and that no 
unobservables affecting the outcome are correlated with the other explanatory variables, the 
interaction coefficient gives the impact of the policy on inequality of opportunity. A few other 
variables capturing institutional differences across the country (see Section 2) where included 
in the specification but did not prove significant: notably, a binary variable indicating the 
states where  Hauptschule  and  Realschule  are combined together, and a binary variable 
indicating the states with comprehensive schools.  
Since the interest here lies in the total effect of social origins on school choices, as we have 
argued before, ability is not taken under control. Moreover, PISA does not report adequate 
measures of ability before school choice is undertaken; the indicator of grade repetitions, 
referring only to the most severe situations, is a very rough measure, unable to capture the 
variability in the ability distribution (repetitions before age 14 are very unusual in Italy); the 
math mark in the last school report, referring to a few months only before the survey was 
carried out, is only slightly less endogenous than the PISA score.
257.1 Results
Parameter estimates and ASE for the social status index ESCS are reported in Table 2. Since 
PISA is based on a two stage sampling scheme
21, observations are correlated. Standard errors 
are underestimated when assuming independence; they can instead be consistently estimated 
with re-sampling procedures (as suggested by PISA analysts, we implemented the modified 
BRR-Balanced Repeated Replication
22 method). 
Nor surprisingly, the ESCS coefficients are significant in all countries: according to the 
estimates, a unit increase in the index (representing a one standard deviation increase of the 
variable at the OECD level) leads to a 3-4 times increase in the odds of enrolling into a 
lyceum: recall however that these values must be taken with caution, as they are biased by 
unobserved heterogeneity. Italy exhibits the smallest value, followed by Netherlands, and 
then Germany. The coefficient of the interaction between  ESCS  and  RESTRICT  in the 
German model is negative and significant, thus the social status effect should be weaker in 
the states with access restrictions. The interaction between ESCS and GENDER in the Italian 
model suggests that the social origin effect should be stronger for males than for females. 
The ASE value, the average partial derivative with respect to social origin across sample 
units (which is instead nearly unbiased with independent unobserved heterogeneity) can be 
interpreted as follows: a unit increase in the ESCS index leads to an approximate average net 
increase in the probability of enrolling into the academic track of 0.188 in Italy, 0.166 in 
Netherlands, 0.209 in the restricted German states and 0.228 in the unrestricted German 
states.  
26Table 2. Estimation results. Modelling ST for the three countries
ITALY
 e
 s  e
 s
Constant -1.470** 0.230 0.145 -1.531** 0.216 0.151
ESCS 1.118** 3.058 0.075 1.304** 3.685 0.0
Female 0.473** 1.604 0.135 0.551** 1.734 0.134
ESCS * Female -0.322** 0.724 0.114
Foreign born (or parents) -0.691** 0.501 0.324 -0.682** 0.506 0.324
Standard family 0.224** 1.252 0.101 0.219** 1.245 0.101
North-East -0.423* 0.655 0.218 -0.42** 0.657 0.211
Center 0.322** 1.381 0.139 0.328** 1.389 0.140
South & Isles 0.348 1.416 0.229 0.344 1.411 0.229
ASEESCS  =0.188    
Wald test= 389.1   
 ASEESCS (male)=0.195; ASEESCS (fem)=0.182
   Wald test= 480.4      
GERMANY
 e
 s  e
 s
Constant -1.756** 0.1727 0.167 -1.794** 0.1663 0.167
ESCS 1.413** 4.1079 0.088 1.431** 4.1827 0.087
ESCS*RESTRICT -0.193 0.8247 0.133 -0.249** 0.7793 130
Female 0.477** 1.6119 0.104 0.469** 1.5988 0.102
Foreign born (or parents) -0.151 0.8596 0.204
Standard family 170 1.1854 0.11 0.188* 1.2074 0.109
East German state 0.351 1.4202 0.246 0.369 1.4468 0.246
RIGID 0.104 1.1098 0.183 0.137 1.1467 0.182
            ASEESCS (restrict) =0.214  ASEESCS (NO restrict)=0.228
                                                                     Wald test=456.5
ASEESCS (restrict) =0.209  
ASEESCS (NO restr.)=0.228  




Constant -2.404** 0.090 0.141
ESCS 1.176** 3.243 0.086
Female 0.191* 1.211 0.104
Foreign born (or parents) -0.004 0.996 230
Standard family 0.715** 2.045 0.125
ASEESCS =0.166   Wald test=223.0  
* 0,05<P<0,10; **P<0,05 assuming approximated normality of parameter estimates.
Figure 4 illustrates the approximate sampling distributions of ASE (estimated with BRR
23) 
for each country; two distributions are evaluated within Germany, one for states with and one 
for the states  without  access restrictions. The estimated distributions display very limited 
overlapping; according to the ASE, the social background effect is lowest in the Netherlands, 
followed by Italy, then the German states with access restrictions, and lastly the German 
states without restrictions. The statistical significance of the difference between the nearest 
27ASE estimates was evaluated under the assumption (supported by normality tests) of a normal 
distribution of ASE maximum-likelihood estimates across replicates. The following p-values 
were obtained: 0.017 for the difference between Italy and the Netherlands, 0.040 for the 
difference between Germany-with restrictions  and Italy, 0.049 for the difference between 
Germany-with restrictions  and Germany-without restrictions.  The significant difference 
within Germany provides evidence that the influence of social origins on school track 
enrolment is weaker with access restrictions.
Notice that the parameter estimates in Table 3 and ASE display an inconsistent ordering: 
when comparing Italy and Netherlands,  the  ASE  is larger for Italy, whereas the  ESCS 
coefficient estimate is larger for Netherlands. The results are consistent with the theoretical 
arguments presented in Section 5.1, according to which logistic regression coefficients may 
have an ambiguous meaning with unobserved heterogeneity.
Figure 4. SB total effect ASE - estimated distribution (via Fay-BRR) in each country
8. Summary and discussion
In the present work we measure the effect of social origins on the choice of secondary school 
track   for   Italy,   the   Netherlands   and   Germany   allowing   for   consistent   cross-country 
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ASEcomparisons, by employing PISA 2003. We evaluate the total  effect of social origins on 
secondary school choices, which includes the direct effect of family background and the 
indirect effect via previous school performance. 
Since no adequate measure of performance before tracking is available, ability is not kept 
under control. Consequently, the adequacy of  logistic regression coefficients for cross-
country  comparisons   in   this   context   is   discussed.  The  literature  highlights   that   with 
independent unobserved heterogeneity estimates are biased towards zero; we show that when 
neglecting ability (which is not independent of social background) we can still refer to the 
independent heterogeneity framework if the total effect is the parameter of interest. Since the 
bias depends on the variance of the omitted variable, it may considerably differ across 
countries, thus, comparing the regression coefficients can be misleading. 
On the other hand, the  average sample derivative  (ASE) – measuring the slope of the 
response probability function where explanatory variables are actually located in the sample – 
is often employed in the literature and is shown by Cramer (2005) to be robust to the omission 
of independent neglected heterogeneity in simple models. In order to extend these conclusions 
to our more complex model, we implement a simulation exercise where we show that the 
omission of previous ability does not substantially affect the relevant ASE. This implies that the 
ASE can be employed to compare the social origin effect in the present context.
The impact of ability-based access restrictions to secondary school tracks on inequality of 
opportunity is also analyzed. First, we propose a simple theoretical model, and we derive that 
restrictions should lower the effect of social origins conditional on ability, but the impact on 
the total effect can go in both directions. Second, by exploiting the institutional differences 
across Länder with respect to enrolment policies, we carry out a preliminary empirical 
analysis on this issue within Germany. The main empirical findings are that the total effect of 
social origins on track choice is weaker in the Netherlands and stronger in Germany, with 
29Italy in between and that, within Germany, parental background appears to be less important 
where access is regulated by ability assessments.  
Thus, access restrictions seem to foster equality of opportunity with respect to how 
individuals of different social origins are sorted into the different tracks. However, this result 
should be interpreted with caution. The empirical analysis developed in this paper is based on 
a very simple model: the causal effect of access restrictions is correctly identified if 
institutional and labor market differences across German states are adequately kept under 
control. The identifying assumption is that the counterfactual (i.e., the value of the outcome – 
here, a measure of inequality of opportunity – that we would observe in the states with 
restrictions if restrictions were not at work)  is correctly represented by what happens in the 
states with no restrictions. This is quite a strong claim: for example, if states enforcing and 
not enforcing enrolment policies were subject to different market conditions, we could get a 
biased assessment of the impact of the policy. 
Secondly, the empirical analysis lacks external validity, and thus the results cannot be 
extended out of Germany. As the theoretical model developed in Section 6 suggests, the total 
effect of social background can either increase or decrease with access restrictions:  if 
admission rules interact with other features of the educational system, different effects are 
possible. For example, inequality appears to be stronger in Germany than in Italy (where 
access is free) and the Netherlands (where access is also regulated), even in those Länder 
where these restrictions are at work; these results suggest that admission rules alone do not 
necessarily counterbalance the negative effects on equality of opportunity due to other 
features of the school design. 
According to our theoretical model, the effect of parental background on secondary school 
choices given ability is reduced with performance-based restrictions; the role of social origins 
in shaping preferences is weakened if we focus on enrolment. In fact, at all ability levels the 
30probability of having a preference for lyceum is higher for the higher status, also when ability 
is below the admission threshold. Since  restrictions  inhibit the enrolment of the low 
performing students, a larger share of the higher status will be denied access to lyceum with 
respect to the lower status.  On the other hand, we show that  the total effect of parental 
background on enrolment can decrease but can also rise with restrictions. Note that these 
results are based on the ceteris paribus assumption. This assumption may however be too 
restrictive: (i) the value attached to the different tracks is likely to change as the system 
becomes more meritocratic; (ii) anticipatory effects (parents of low performing children 
giving additional support to their offspring's learning in order to avoid later exclusion from 
the academic track) could be enhanced with ability restrictions, especially for the higher 
status, pushing up school performance differentials and consequently the total effect. 
Concluding, we think that there is scope for more theoretical and empirical research on the 
impact of access restrictions. In order to shed light on the mechanisms at work it would be of 
interest to derive the structural parameters of the model, yet, since information on both 
individual preferences and actual enrollment is required, this is not an easy task to accomplish 
at the moment.  
Appendix - The simulation study 
The aim of the simulation study is to investigate the behaviour of the logistic regression 
coefficients in the track choice model, when previous ability is omitted; to assess use of ASE, 
(and ESA) to interpret the effects of explanatory variables in the above context; to evaluate 
the inclusion of PISA scores as a proxy of students' unobserved ability before choice. We 
strictly stick to the model in Section 4, and fix the parameters by referring to real data
24 
whenever possible. We generate data for a continuos variable SB (similar to ESCS in PISA), 
and for previous ability AB1, track choice TC, ability after tracking AB2.
31A.1 - The simulation model
35 independent samples of size n = 1000 are generated for each simulation of the model 
defined in equations (1)-(3). Since the ESCS empirical distribution in the Italian sample is 
nearly normal, SB is randomly generated from a normal distribution with the ESCS observed 
mean and variance. Previous ability AB1 is generated according to equation (1), where the 
values of  and the error variance are equal to the corresponding estimates of a comparable 
regression of PIRLS 2001 performance scores (PIRLS-Progress in International Reading and 
Literacy Study is an international assessment similar to PISA carried out on 4
th graders). 
School track  TC  is generated as in (2a)-(2b). This is the equation of main interest: by 
considering various pairs of ability ( )   and social background () coefficients, we are able to 
assess the behaviour of the estimates in different situations. For each set of values (;),  is 
adjusted in order to get percentages of individuals in each track as close as possible to the 
observed distribution. Ability after tracking  AB2  is generated as in (3) with a normally 
distributed error; the regression coefficients estimates of the model for PISA scores on SB and 
TC are taken, while the unknown AB1 coefficient is fixed arbitrarily, but at a “reasonable” 
level.
A logistic regression for TC is then estimated for each of the 35 replicated samples with 
the following explanatory variables: (i) AB1 and SB (full model), as a reference point; (ii) SB 
only (reduced model), to study how the estimate of the social background total effect (+) 
on track choice is affected by omission of previous ability; (iii) SB and AB2, to assess how the 
inclusion of PISA scores as a proxy of previous ability (as done in Schnepf, 2002 and in 
Checchi and Flabbi, 2007) biases the estimate of  and . Logit regression coefficients, ASE 
and ESA associated to the total effect of social origins, together with their standard errors are 
computed for every full and reduced model.
32A2.  When previous ability is omitted
The results of the simulation study are summarised in Table 3. Columns (1)-(4) report the 
values of the parameters generating the data, while columns (5)-(8) refer to the results of the 
simulations: the average values and standard deviations of the estimates of the total effect 
across replications. The higher panel refers to a set of simulations where the values of  and  
give rise to an estimated total effect close to the actual estimate for Italy 1.118 (see Section 
7.1). The true value of (+) is often much higher than the corresponding estimate. In the 
lower panel we consider cases with =0, where the omitted variable is uncorrelated with 
included regressors. Here the true effect is set to 1.118; again, the estimated coefficients are 
much smaller. These results altogether demonstrate that logit regression coefficients are 
heavily downward biased, even when the omitted variable is uncorrelated with the included 
regressors. The average values across replications of ASE under the full model (correctly 
including SB and previous ability) are reported in column (6); these estimates are unbiased 
and thus are taken as a reference point in column (7), where the ratio of  the estimated ASE 
for the reduced and the full model is shown. Column (8) refers to the same ratio for ESA. 
Whereas ESA varies considerably from full to reduced model, the ASE ratio is always very 
close to 1 and standard deviations are generally small. Such results strongly suggest that ASE 
is a more reliable measure of the effect of covariates on binary response variables than logit 
regression coefficients
25, and it is thus more suitable for cross-country comparisons in the 
context under study.






















0.064 1.400 25 3.000 1.188  (0.084) 0.198  (0.011) 1.017  (0.068) 1.195
0.044 1.000 25 2.000 1.092  (0.072) 0.197  (0.018) 0.989  (0.068) 0.909
0.034 0.950 25 1.650 1.102  (0.071) 0.175  (0.008) 0.998  (0.048) 0.945
0.024 0.900 25 1.500 1.084  (0.091) 0.197  (0.010) 0.988  (0.036) 0.833
0.014 0.900 25 1.400 1.123  (0.093) 0.198  (0.010) 1.002  (0.028) 0.960
0.004 1.050 25 1.200 1.130  (0.077) 0.202  (0.013) 1.002  (0.008) 1.008
     
0.014 1.118 0 1.118 0.962  (0.088) 0.176  (0.013) 0.999  (0.025) 0.950
0.024 1.118 0 1.118 0.783  (0.087) 0.156  (0.009) 0.977  (0.049) 0.805
0.034 1.118 0 1.118 0.666  (0.071) 0.124  (0.010) 0.997  (0.069) 0.908
0.044 1.118 0 1.118 0.538  (0.068) 0.106  (0.011) 1.008  (0.085) 0.872
0.064 1.118 0 1.118 0.436  (0.074) 0.086  (0.008) 1.018  (0.131) 1.162
0.084 1.118 0 1.118 0.312  (0.065) 0.064  (0.010) 1.046  (0.179) 1.162
* Columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 show averages over the replicated simulations (standard errors in parentheses)
A3. Employing  PISA scores to proxy ability 
All simulations carried out show that including PISA scores AB2 as a proxy for previous 
ability AB1 can have dramatic consequences. Regression coefficients  and  are heavily 
biased; the direction of the bias varies across simulations depending on the other parameters 
values. Examples of situations with bias in different directions are reported in Table 4. The 
estimate of  can even become negative in some cases (see column 3), implying that a higher 
social origins would lower the probability to enrol to the academic track. Notice that results 
can be very misleading even when the track has a weak influence on AB2 (small d', mimicking 
for example situations where the timespan between tracking and the PISA survey is small).
34Table 4. Different bias configurations when using AB2 (PISA scores) in logistic models for SC
(1)
 ,   both 
biased downward
(2)
 ,   both 
biased upward
(3)
   biased downward
   biased upward
(4)
   biased downward
   biased upward
x 0.399 0.764 0.764 0.028
l 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.044
g 37 25 25 25
b' 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
g' 23 0 50 20
d'  82 200 200 45
E(   ) 0.355 0.843 -0.846 0.260
  0.108 0.173 0.222 0.074
E(   ) 0.020 0.034 0.034 0.013
  0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
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37NOTES
1 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS).
2 The survey Percorsi di Studio e Lavoro dei Diplomati (ISTAT 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007) is specifically designed to 
investigate the tertiary education and working careers of selected cohorts of secondary school leavers. 
3 Data from household or population surveys is also inadequate because it does not allow to focus on specific cohorts 
of students (cohort sample sizes are typically too small).
4 Recent research indicates that at least one third of families do not follow the advice offered by the student's teachers 
at the end lower secondary school (Checchi, 2008).
5   The same approach has been employed by Schnepf (2002).
6 In this light, we will not consider this school type as belonging to the academic track in the empirical analyses. 
7 CITO (Central Institute for Test Development), a private enterprise created under the auspices of the Dutch 
Education Ministry, develops testing tools for the analysis of individual knowledge, skills and competences in a 
wide variety of contexts. Among them is the End of primary school Test, administered to about 85% of pupils 
finishing primary schools in the Netherlands and measuring academic skills in four areas: language, mathematics, 
study skills and world orientation.
8 Although in some cases the first period at the chosen school is considered a trial period.
9 Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Saarland, Sachsen and Thüringen (with about 1/3 of the students population) will be 
classified as states with restricted access policies for 2003 (KMK, 2006) in the empirical analyses.
10 Such as Oberschulen, Sekundarschulen, Erweiterte Realschulen, Mittelschulen, Regelschulen.
11 Although regional differences are marked: performance scores are much higher in the North of the country than in 
the South.
12  Here the term ability has a somewhat loose meaning, avoiding all controversies about its definition and evaluation, 
as the structure of the model is unaffected by the particular definition employed (note however that the literature on 
primary and secondary effects explicitly refers to “demonstrated ability”, i.e. the official evaluation of a student's 
learning advancement, usually grade point average, which is more likely to be involved in the school track decision-
making process). 
13 Let UL being the utility of lyceum and UO the utility of the other school tracks. Individual choose the option with the 
highest utility. We can think of U as the difference (UL-UO);  lyceum is chosen if U>0, other tracks if U<0.NOTES
14 If innate ability is genetically transmitted,  an intergenerational mechanism of social selection induces some 
correlation between innate ability and social status, making it impossible to separately identify the effects of 
“nurture” (which can be targeted by public intervention) and the effects of  “nature” (which cannot be targeted by 
public intervention).  
15 Referring to a continuos variable is relevant in this context because in the empirical analysis we employ the 
continuos variable ESCS (see Section 7); other almost continuos variables measuring occupational prestige (SEI, for 
example) are sometimes employed as well. Notice however that the discussion also holds for discrete variables; a 
measure based on average sample probability differences could be employed instead.
16 Strictly speaking, the models are misspecified because of the omission of ability (see Section 5), although 
consequences are shown to be negligible if ASE is employed as a measure of inequality of opportunity. An additional 
source of misspecification applies for Netherlands and the restricted German states, where preferences and 
enrolment do not overlap. In this case the model should be formalised by superimposing condition (7) on the model 
for track choice and averaging with respect to  AB  as shown in (8). Unless strong assumptions are made, the 
structural model cannot be estimated if data on preferences and actual enrollment are not both available. For these 
reasons, notwithstanding the misspecification, the empirical analysis is based on the simple logistic specification 
with track enrollment as the dependent variable.          
17 Like Piedmont, Tuscany, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige.
18 Given the features of the socio-pedagogic-lyceum (see Section 2), we decided not to include it in the academic track. 
Unfortunately, in the PISA database Italian licei also includes this school type. Given the fact that girls are the large 
majority of the student in  socio-pedagogic schools, distinctly from the other school types, we identified these 
schools as those with at least 80% of females (to mirror the proportion reported by the official statistics at a national 
level). 
19 Following Woessmann (2007) the state of Berlin is considered an Eastern German Länder.
20 In PISA 2003 German Länder are not explicitly identified. We have sent a request for this information to the 
Institute for Educational Progress, Berlin. In the meantime, a first identification is possible because the states have 
been used as a stratification variable (OECD, 2005). Excluding special education and vocational schools, the 
remaining 16 strata could be attributed to a Länder, by comparing strata and states with respect to their relative size 
and the percentage of students enrolled to different school types (official data on school types at the Länder level is NOTES
in Prenzel et al, 2005). For the purpose of this work, this provisional identification was employed only in aggregate 
form, represented by the variables EAST and RESTRICT described above.
21  Schools are the primary sampling units, chosen with probability proportional to their size; around 30 students are 
randomly chosen within each school. Weights are adjusted to give each student the same selection probability, 
considering their school, the oversampling of some strata, school and student non-response and other inaccuracies.
22 BRR is derived from the well-known Jackknife method but uses a more complex scheme of unit removing and re-
weighting; further stability is added by Fay modification, avoiding the complete removal of units and building each 
replication using weights. 
23 Since only 80 replicated observations are available for each density, the histogram shows rough B-spline smoothing 
approximations.
24 With reference to PISA 2003 and to the international assessment carried out on 4
th graders PIRLS 2001 (Progress in 
International Reading and Literacy Study).
25 At first sight it may seems strange that the ASE values across the simulations are remarkably close to each other in 
models with different parameter values. However it must be recalled that ASE and logit regression coefficients 
measure different aspects of the effect of explanatory variables, and the ASE for a covariate is influenced by both its 
regression coefficient and the model intercept. Since the constant was here determined in order to keep the marginal 
distribution of TC as similar as possible to the observed distribution in all simulations, the response probability 
curves corresponding to higher value of the total effect are steeper in the central part of the distribution of SB, but 
are less steep near the tails. On average, the partial derivatives can indeed be roughly the same across simulations. 